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In the context of casino gambling, only
a minority (∼15%) of players presented
with a streak of at least length 6 in roulette
disregard recent events in deciding their
next move, which is the normatively opti-
mal approach to such a decision (Croson
and Sundali, 2005). The majority of peo-
ple would instead subscribe to a belief
in a recency effect. This intriguing pat-
tern of reasoning is categorized as either
the gambler’s fallacy, when the subject
perceives negative recency (GF; Laplace,
1951; Tune, 1964; Tversky and Kahneman,
1971), or as the hot hand fallacy, when pos-
itive recency is perceived (HH; Gilovich
et al., 1985). Such tendencies demonstrate,
among a variety of things, that magical
thinking is not exclusive to astrologists
and tarot fanatics. Both the GF and HH
refer to instances of the subject projecting
a relationship between prior and present
events, albeit in opposing directions. For
example, subsequent to observing a run
of 6 “heads,” a subject committing the
GF would expect “tails” on the next coin
toss. Alternatively, a subject committing
the HH, following a similar streak of, say,
successful basketball throws, would expect
another “hit” on the next throw. Both fal-
lacies have been posited as consequences
of our immanent adherence to the law
of small numbers—a distorted conception
of chance, according to which short ran-
dom sequences are considered highly rep-
resentative of their underlying generating
process (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971;
Gilovich et al., 1985); But, counterintu-
itively, when dealing with sequences gov-
erned by chance, the short sub-sequences
that we mistake as essentially repre-
sentative of the overall generating pro-
cess, actually deviate systematically from
sequential properties on the global level;
such small sub-sequences, on the basis of
which we draw predictive inferences, are
rathermisrepresentative, containing exces-
sive alternations and lacking sufficient
long runs (Gilovich et al., 1985).
When predicting the next outcome in a
random bivariate sequence of events, after
having observed a local streak in either
direction, we tend to fall into one of two
behavioral categories, depending on how
random the underlying process is per-
ceived to be (Burns and Corpus, 2004). In
accordance with the law of small numbers,
when the conception of a random generat-
ing process is committed to, we expect the
next event following a streak of a particu-
lar signal to switch to the alternate signal.
Alternatively, when the generating process
is believed to be nonrandom, we tend to
expect the next signal to be consistent with
that of the preceding streak. In very simple
terms, given a streak in one direction (e.g.,
three heads in a row):
(a) When a causal mechanism explain-
ing the streak does not easily come to
mind, we tend to commit the GF (e.g.,
after a few heads, we believe the next
throw is more likely to land tails). This
occurs most often when the sequen-
tial probability is perceived to be fixed
(Navarrete and Santamaría, 2012).
(b) When a causal mechanism is easily
accessible (e.g., tampered coin, hot
hand, etc.), and the sequence appears
to be non-representative of our typi-
fied notion of a random sequence, we
tend to commit the HH (e.g., after a
few successful shots, the player is more
likely to succeed again).
In general, we hold—or are inclined to
feel as though we hold—a certain degree
of control over the events of our imme-
diate environment (Harris and Osman,
2012). We tend to think that the prob-
ability of experiencing a car accident is
related to our performance behind the
wheel; andwhile this is oftentimes the case,
it is definitely not the case as frequently
as we would like. The difficulties humans
encounter in dealing with phenomena of
fixed probabilities are likely related to the
fact that, amidst our proximal surround-
ings, things rarely appear to occur by
pure chance. Ordinary events around us
are sourced in recognizable causes and
elicit appreciable consequences. Moreover,
we are innately specialized in discerning
patterns (Lopes, 1982) and cause-effect
relationships between successive events—
especially those in temporal proximity to
one another. From an ecological stand-
point it is rare for one to observe sequen-
tial events that are completely independent
of each other (Ayton and Fischer, 2004).
Thus, it is of little surprise that we exhibit
a distinctive ineptitude when it comes to
handling random sequences.
Situations in which past events bear
no influence on those of future ones,
and, in particular, in which the proba-
bility of sequential outcomes is fixed, are
primarily confined to games of chance,
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psychology laboratories, and sample
spaces that tend toward infinity (Navarrete
and Santamaría, 2012). Games of chance
are known to be commonly addictive—a
feature perhaps attributable to an illusory
sense of control linked to an incapabil-
ity to understand how they operate. One
could argue that games of chance were cre-
ated with the intent of deceiving humans
(Pinker, 1997). Moreover ecological cir-
cumstances in which the sample-size
accessible to the subject exceeds a few
dozen events are virtually absent from a
rural or hunter gatherer setting (and likely
from any other). Throughout our evolu-
tionary history, it is likely that humans
confronted minimally-sized samples
exclusively, for which our current limited-
capacity numerical cognition served us
adequately (as a cautionary side note,
see (Navarrete and Santamaría, 2011) for
a comment on why such evolutionary
arguments should be treated with special
care). The numerical representations we
seem hardwired to invoke are ill-suited for
the processing of large samples. Dehaene
et al. propose that we have, in essence, a
very precise number-sense for reasoning
about very small quantities (∼4), and
a separate modality—blurred and less
precise— that we apply to large quan-
tities (Dehaene, 1986; Feigenson et al.,
2004). Evidently, our limited working
memory and numerical cognition sys-
tems have historically been sufficient for
our persistence as a species, and a more
sophisticated reasoning apparatus was
never selected for. If the inherent restric-
tions imposed by our numeric reasoning
systems are compounded with the known
functional constraints on working mem-
ory (and those of attention; Hahn and
Warren, 2009), a likely outcome would
be an inability to maintain accurate men-
tal record of over a few dozen events of
a given sample space, and more gener-
ally, an inability to work with complex
datasets without external aid (i.e., com-
puters, modern statistics, etc.). This might
partly explain our erroneous intuitions
concerning randomness (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1972), and our tendency to expect
random sampling to satisfy the law of
small numbers (Tversky and Kahneman,
1971; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972).
Limitations on memory and attention
in a context where information-access is
constrained by design (small samples) ren-
ders likely a belief in the law of small num-
bers. We tend to generalize on the basis
of limited samples because this has proba-
bly been our only decision-making option
throughout our evolutionary history. With
the advent and advancement of statisti-
cal methodologies and machine learning
algorithms, we now know that there are
more accurate performing strategies, but
the sheer volume of resources required
as a substrate for their operation may
never have been possible (see (Olsson and
Brown, 2010) for an example of how the
smartest strategy is not necessarily the bet-
ter within a foraging context). Prejudices
are exemplary of how the use of mini-
mal information to reach far-fetched con-
clusions may make sense. While morally
controversial, prejudices seem to confer an
adaptive function.With respect to decision
making in the natural world, such general-
izations lead to favorable outcomes more
often than decisions left up to chance.
Furthermore, a strong proclivity toward
over-generalization is probably—or once
was—critical to survival. If this morning I
witnessed a fellow human enter a cave and
subsequently get eaten by a bear, it is likely
in my interests to be particularly cautious
about entering into new caves from now
on. Despite the incongruity between the
law of small numbers and normative mod-
els (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) the
former may be a close-to-optimal system,
given the set of possibilities available to the
human agent in its ecological setting.
The access to samples of only a limited
size throughout our evolutionary history
would circumscribe the inferential strate-
gies available to a given individual. An
example can be seen in the context of
mate selection. The probability of find-
ing a couple possessing a set of specific
qualities would depend on the distribu-
tion of such traits within the population,
and negatively correlated with the num-
ber and scarcity of those qualities. The
size of the population one has access to
determines the nature of successful strate-
gies. In small-to-medium communities or
primitive societies, the possibility of being
rejected by the few “ideal candidates” war-
ranted a higher degree of flexibility. In
modern times, a change in bar, city, or
mere patience would suffice. But in the
face of minimal information, an individual
who considers such as a good represen-
tation of all possible cases, and quickly
reacts and adjusts to it, would be poten-
tially more efficient than an individual that
uses a more resource-hungry approach.
When confronting limited opportunities
for success, there is incentive to reach a
conclusion as efficiently and promptly as
possible.
The very fact that there commonly
exist causal agents—both tangible and
identifiable—that account for the things
that happen around us renders the HH
(Gilovich et al., 1985) sensible in natural
contexts (Pinker, 1997; Wilke and Barrett,
2009). Who wouldn’t cede his spear to
the hunter that nailed the last 3 in a
row over the one that is well known for
his accuracy, but has missed the last 3
attempts? We are accustomed to seeking
out and characterizing underlying causes
of the phenomena we encounter: perhaps
the better hunter is feeling unwell, one
might speculate. Conversely, it might be
conjectured that the hunter who is on
fire has been practicing copiously and dis-
covered a new trick. Chance invariably
plays an important role; but learning, sick-
ness, and a few hundred other specific
and quantifiable causes are also of sig-
nificance (Ayton and Fischer, 2004). On
the other hand, the small role we tend to
attribute to chance, let alone pure ran-
domness, and the very little experience
we have dealing with it, combined with
our habit of treating small samples as
representative of the population to which
they belong, renders natural the emer-
gence of the GF in non-ecological settings,
such as casinos and games of chance. As
mentioned, the law of small numbers is
likely not the best possible performing
strategy with respect to inferential accu-
racy, but it is saliently conservative in
resource utilization, and necessitates very
little information to function, as com-
pared to other more sophisticated systems.
And in an environment where a great
deal of observable events have apprecia-
ble underlying causes, a generally rapid-
trigger inductive system could be not only
good enough, but even a superior alterna-
tive to time and resource consuming sys-
tems. A similar argument has been made
by Gigerenzer and colleagues regarding
one-reason decision-making (Gigerenzer
and Goldstein, 1996).
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Both GF and HH have been historically
considered clear and somehow embarrass-
ing fallacies, deriving from our tendency
to believe that small samples are repre-
sentative of the population (law of small
numbers). Some authors have recently put
forward arguments concerning the notion
that the HH may often lead to accurate
conclusions regarding the generation of
sequential events, and confer evolution-
ary value (Haselton et al., 2009; Wilke and
Barrett, 2009). We believe some of these
arguments can also be applied to the gam-
bler’s fallacy, and generally to our intrinsic
adherence to the law of small numbers.
In forming our causal accounts of phe-
nomena, however, we tend to overlook the
role of chance—the unexplainable varia-
tion or noise that pervades our acquired
data. The survival of a particular tribe does
not depend on the numeric average of an
infinite ideal population, but rather on the
hunters returning to the village with meat.
And we all know that to arrive at the aver-
age necessitates our surrendering at least
some of the details that give sense to the
world. Human survival profoundly hinges
on an uncanny ability to decipher sensi-
ble patterns amidst an overwhelming flux
of peripheral stimuli, in practice ignoring
the chance part of the equation. Although
it is an unavoidable truth that we often
make mistakes, the fact that we continue
to stick around might be living proof that
we are right more often than not; so, per-
haps the law of small numbers is not so bad
after all.
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